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he recent reports of experiments aimed at demonstrating the
ability of avian H5N1 inﬂuenza virus to become transmitted
from human to human have generated a vigorous and important
debate. While the details of the work remain largely undisclosed,
both the Fouchier and the Kawaoka laboratories were able to take
this virus, which to date has infected humans through direct con-
tact with birds, and make it able to transmit from ferret to ferret,
an experimental animal model for human-to-human transmis-
sion. Much of the debate has focused on biosecurity issues. The
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity was asked to re-
view the manuscripts and advise the U.S. government about the
security risks; its conclusion was that, at this time, the risks pre-
sented by these ﬁndings outweigh the beneﬁts to society (1, 2).
Many inﬂuenza virologists have countered that the risks are min-
imal and that there is a greater risk of not making the results
available through the normal publication route (3). Largely miss-
ing from these discussions, however, has been the topic of bio-
safety.
Useful starting points for any consideration of laboratory bio-
safety are Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories
(BMBL) (4) from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services and the Laboratory Biosafety Manual (5) from the World
Health Organization. Paramount to the determination of bio-
safety containment is a careful risk assessment of the agent. There
are four questions that are generally considered. First, does the
agentcausediseaseinhealthyhumans,animals,orplants?Second,
if so, how severe is the disease? Third, how transmissible is the
agent, and what is the route of transmission? Fourth, are preven-
tativeortherapeuticinterventionsavailableand,ifso,howwidely?
The BMBL notes that one must consider the risks to both labora-
tory personnel and the community.
The H5N1 inﬂuenza viruses under discussion fall in the cate-
gory of highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza (HPAI). As such, these
viruses have high virulence and need to be handled with caution.
TheBMBLrecommendsbiosafetylevel3(BSL3)containmentfor
HPAI,notingtherisktohumansandtoagriculture.Itisofinterest
to note that, due to its pandemic potential, work with the 1918
H1N1strain,whicharguablywouldbelesslethaltodaythanitwas
in 1918 due to improvements in medical care, is also recom-
mended to occur at BSL3.
The question is, does making the H5N1 virus transmissible
among mammals change its biosafety proﬁle? Let us begin by an-
sweringthequestionsposedabove.H5N1inﬂuenzaclearlycauses
disease in otherwise healthy humans and animals. That disease is
severe: the case fatality rate (CFR) in humans with H5N1 inﬂu-
enza virus is reported to be over 50% (World Health Organiza-
tion, Conﬁrmed human cases of H5N1 2003–2012; http://www
.who.int/inﬂuenza/human_animal_interface/H5N1_cumulative
_table_archives/en/index.html). While there has been debate
regarding the true number of infected humans, it is evident that
theCFRiscertainlyabovethatofthe1918strain,somethingabout
which most experts agree (6). Until additional data are collected,
wemustassumethatalargepercentageofinfectedindividualswill
not survive H5N1 infection. The third question deals with trans-
mission. This new inﬂuenza virus is spread through a respiratory
route and, therefore, will be present in aerosols created in the
laboratory. The BMBL makes special note of agents that can be
transmitted by the aerosol route, categorizing them as “serious
laboratory hazard[s].” Some scientists have suggested that trans-
missionbetweenferretsdoesnotnecessarilytranslateintohuman
transmissibility(7).Whileacknowledgingthattheferretisindeed
an experimental model, we must assume that it is a valid model
and therefore that this virus would spread similarly to other pan-
demic human strains in history. Finally, there is the issue of treat-
ment and prevention. To date, a vaccine against H5N1 inﬂuenza
virus has not been available, ruling out immunization of labora-
toryworkersorthegeneralpublic.Whilethevirusdoesrespondto
commonly used antivirals, it is reasonable to assume, based on
experience with the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, that virus spread
would outpace the capacity of the public health system. In addi-
tion, if there were an H5N1 pandemic, drug resistance would un-
doubtedly evolve.
Overall, then, we believe that the newly derived H5N1 HPAI
virus should be handled at the highest biocontainment level,
BSL4. This is largely based on a comparison to the natural H5N1
inﬂuenzavirus.Forexample,thehuman-to-humantransmissible
form is, by deﬁnition, able to spread more readily. If a BSL3
worker were to be infected with natural H5N1 virus, the infection
wouldlikelystopinthatindividual.Withhuman-to-humanaero-
soltransmission,otherscouldbecomeinfected.Ithasbeenargued
that by the time the nonspeciﬁc symptoms of inﬂuenza have been
conﬁrmed to be bona ﬁde inﬂuenza, it is too late for drugs to be
effective (8). Subsequent transmission could occur rapidly, out-
pacing the public health system’s capability to contain it. Given
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® mbio.asm.org 1the mortality rate, such a laboratory exposure event could lead to
unacceptable numbers of deaths. Once outside the laboratory,
thereisalsoathreattofarmanimalssuchaspigs.Wealsonotethat
in addition to the enhanced biosafety procedures in a BSL4 facil-
ity, the agent would have more physical security.
These considerations and the assumptions used to analyze
them have become more public over the past decade as high-level
pathogen work has found its way into academic settings, outside
the traditional boundaries of government laboratories. The envi-
ronmental impact statements required for these projects, pre-
pared by expert panels and made public to the surrounding com-
munities, have raised the bar considerably for those who wish to
have their safety assumptions and scenarios vetted in the public
light. Although the matter at hand is not yet subject to those reg-
imented assessments, it is not exempted from the same public
scrutiny and the same need for high-level safety assurance.
Of course, one could argue that we may be wrong in our as-
sumptions regarding the validity of the ferret model and that bet-
ter serological studies may indicate that the CFR is more like that
of seasonal inﬂuenza. In the meantime, why not follow the pre-
cautionaryprinciple?Wewoulddrawananalogytotheearlydays
of recombinant DNA work. It is almost hard to believe today that
the cloning of the herpes simplex virus thymidine kinase gene in
1979 was carried out at BSL4 (or P4, as it was then known) con-
tainment (9). This experiment was originally judged to be high
risk,butovertimewecametounderstandthatitisnot:today,the
same work would be performed at BSL1 containment (NIH
guidelines, Section III-E-1). Perhaps an H5N1 vaccine will soon
be available, making high-level containment no longer necessary.
Until data are obtained to show that human-to-human transmis-
sible H5N1 inﬂuenza is not as dangerous as it seems, however, we
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